Abstract. We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment, compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties. 2 1. Introduction Without legal enforcement, social norms rely on informal sanctions to produce norm-conforming behavior. Empirical studies have reported evidence of negative sanctions (e.g., punishment) both by parties directly involved in the normgoverned interaction (de Quervain, et al., 2004) , and by uninvolved third parties (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007; Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011) . In these studies, harm refers to a violation of norms of fairness or reciprocity, but no distinction is made as to whether punishment is a general response to one party harming another, or a response to the violation of a specific social norm.
Introduction
Without legal enforcement, social norms rely on informal sanctions to produce norm-conforming behavior. Empirical studies have reported evidence of negative sanctions (e.g., punishment) both by parties directly involved in the normgoverned interaction (de Quervain, et al., 2004) , and by uninvolved third parties (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007; Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011) . In these studies, harm refers to a violation of norms of fairness or reciprocity, but no distinction is made as to whether punishment is a general response to one party harming another, or a response to the violation of a specific social norm.
1 Moreover, although negative sanctioning is more commonly studied, it is not the sole mechanism of upholding a social norm. Both positive sanctioning (e.g., rewarding norm-abiding behavior) and compensating the victim of a norm violation are other norm-enforcing mechanisms, but few laboratory studies have compared these with third-party punishment (cf. Almenberg, Dreber, Apicella, & Rand, 2011) . Moreover, the opportunity to compensate victims might focus third parties on feelings of compassion, which has been found to decrease punitive sentiment (Condon & DeSteno, 2011 ).
An example is the punishment of individuals who divide a good unfairly, when the understanding of what constitutes fair division depends on context. Under an equality context, a fair division is one in which goods are allocated equally amongst all parties. Under an equity context, a fair division is one that divides goods according to each party's share due to merit or acquired right. If third party punishment is a general mechanism insensitive to context, punishment levels will not differ under contexts that invoke rules either of equity or equality. Alternatively, if punishment is norm-specific, uneven divisions will be punished less under equity contexts in which one party is perceived as being entitled to a greater share of the good.
One reason why non-negative sanctioning has received less attention may be that there are several evolutionary arguments that invoke third-party punishment (see, e.g., Gintis et al., 2008) . In an evolutionary context, pure rewarding or compensating strategies suffer net costs without reducing the fitness of norm violating, thereby allowing offending strategies to replicate unchecked. Instead, if a norm specifies that one ought to receive a fair share or divide a good fairly, then third parties will prefer to compensate victims of violations of the norm, as victims are perceived as having a right to be treated fairly. Positive sanctions offer another way of enforcing norms, as those who conform to the norm ought -especially when temptation or the opportunity cost of conformity is high -to be rewarded. Our hypothesis is thus that third parties will employ both compensation and positive sanctions in addition to negative sanctions when all three regulatory mechanisms are available.
To test this hypothesis, we focused on a version of the Ultimatum Game (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) in which Proposers proposed a division of a sum of $10 to Responders, who accepted or rejected the offer. In the case of a rejection, both parties receive nothing. Previous studies have found that both Proposer behavior and second-party punishment are sensitive to different fairness contexts. When the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned randomly, Proposers offered an average of 45% of the sum (for a review, see Camerer, 2003, Chapter 2) . But when the role of Proposer was earned by higher scorers on a general knowledge quiz, Proposers offered an average of only 35%. Moreover, overall rejection rates were the same whether roles were assigned randomly or based on quiz performance (Hoffman, McCabe, Keith, & Smith, 1994) , although Proposers offered moderately less in the latter condition, apparently feeling entitled to a larger share under an equity context. Similarly, Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher (2003) created different offer contexts by allowing the Proposer to 1) choose between offering 20%
and 50%, and 2) choose between offering 20% and 0%. They found that in the first context, Proposers offered 20% only 31% of the time, but in the second context they always offered 20%. Moreover, in the first context, Responders who were offered 20% rejected the offer 44% of the time, whereas in the second context, Responders who were offered 20% rejected only 9% of the time. In the first context, the presence of a 50/50 option prompts a norm of fairness, whereas in the second case an offer of 20% may just be perceived as generous (see Bicchieri, 2006, Chapter 3) . Thus, second-party punishment is clearly sensitive to context, and whether a given context elicits a specific norm.
Is third-party punishment, compensation, or rewarding behavior sensitive to fairness context? To answer this question, we conducted a two-stage study in which participants engaged in an Ultimatum Game under an equity or equality context in Stage 1, and in Stage 2, third parties decided to add to or deduct from the payoffs of 5 participants from Stage 1 based on their bargaining outcome. To determine whether third parties were willing to trade off compensation and punishment, we created a separate experimental condition in which third parties only had the option of deducting from the payoffs of Stage 1 participants. This design allowed us to assess whether third parties preferred to compensate victims or punish perpetrators of unfair bargaining outcomes, and to assess whether third parties would reward fair bargaining outcomes. We discuss data only from Stage 2 below.
Materials and Methods

Participants
198 college-age participants took part in Stage 2 of our study, for which advertisements specified that participants would earn $5.00 in addition to an amount that would depend on decisions made during the experiment. Of these 198 participants, we excluded 2 due to data entry problems, leaving a total sample size of 196.
Procedure
In Stage 1, participants were asked to read an article and were then given a written quiz on the contents of the article. They then played a single Ultimatum Game, in which a Proposer was randomly and anonymously paired with a Responder, and offered a division of $10 in increments of $1 to the Responder. That is, the Proposer could choose an offer of $10 for the Proposer and $0 for the Responder, $9for the Proposer and $1for the Responder, $8 for the Proposer and $2for the Responder, etc., so that the two amounts summed to $10-hereafter, these divisions are denoted ($10,$0), ($9,$1), ($8,$2), and so on, where the first amount is the Proposer's payoff and the second amount is the Responder's payoff. The Responder then chose to accept or reject the offer; in the case of an acceptance, the Proposer and Responder got the amounts specified by the offer, but in the case of a rejection, both parties got nothing. In the equity condition, the roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned based on quiz performance, where the instructions emphasized the entitlement of the In the all-adjustments condition, participants were given $2.50 that they could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or deduct from the actual payoff of a Proposer from Stage 1, and another $2.50 that they could use at a ratio of 1:4 to add to or deduct from the payoff the Responder who was paired with the Proposer. For the uneven bargaining outcomes of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), this condition allowed participants to punish Proposers and/or compensate Responders in various degrees and in any combination. For the even bargaining outcome of ($5,$5), it allowed participants to reward Proposers or exhibit the unlikely spiteful behavior of deducting from the payoff of either Proposers or Responders. The deduct-only condition was the same as the all-adjustments condition, except that participants could adjust the Proposer's and Responder's payoffs only by deducting from them, which forced participants to punish Proposers if they wished to enact any sanctions.
Participants were informed that they would have to announce their decision to the room full of other third parties at the end of the experiment, and that their decisions were therefore not anonymous. Though the lack of anonymity may create incentives to perform in front of others (third parties and experimenters), we explicitly introduced it because such environment would make very clear the sort of normative constraints under which people operate. For example, if punishment of norm transgressors is socially expected, we would predict a sizable number of third parties to punish unfair Proposers or possibly reward fair ones.
Finally, at the end of the study, Stage 2 participants were given a questionnaire. The first question read, "Do you believe the following proposal is fair for both the Proposer and the Responder?" and then listed the 11 possible divisions of the $10.00 sum. The second question read:
"The questions below refer to the first page of this survey, which all participants in this experiment are answering. After we collect all participants' forms, we will randomly select three questions from this page, for which you will earn a $1.00 bonus each, if you guessed correctly. Now for each line below, please guess whether the majority of the participants in this room thought that that particular proposal was fair. Circle your answers," and then listed the 11 possible divisions again. The binary responses to these 22 variables comprised the belief data, which were designed to measure third parties' respective first-and second-order beliefs about the fairness of each offer. For an outcome to fit the definition of a social norm (Bicchieri, 2006) , there must be agreement in second-order beliefs about what is fair. That is, there must be a shared agreement that a specific behavior is socially prescribed (or proscribed) in a given context. For example, individuals could believe that ($5,$5) is fair (first-order belief), but not expect others to believe it (second-order belief), in which case there would be no shared belief that ($5,$5) is socially prescribed. Without agreement in second-order beliefs, a behavioral regularity would not be a social norm, as there would be no agreement about what behaviors constitute a norm violation and therefore might elicit a sanction.
Design
This led to a 2 x 3 x 2 between-participants design of adjustment condition (deductonly or punish/compensate/reward), offer (($5,$5), ($7,$3), or ($8,$2)), and fairness context (equity or equality). The dependent variable was the pair of adjustments in USD that the third party made to the Proposer's and Responder's payoffs. We predicted that the amounts paid to punish the Proposer and compensate the Responder would decrease with increases in the amount that the Proposer offered to the Responder, as third parties would find fewer reasons to adjust payoffs for divisions which were closer to equality. However, we expected the effect of offer would be moderated by fairness context, as uneven offers would be interpreted as being fairer under an equity context. As a separate hypothesis, we predicted that participants would trade off punishment and compensation in the all-adjustments condition, so that the amounts they deducted from the Proposer's payoff would be lower than in the deduct-only condition. Whenever presented with even offers of ($5,$5) in the all-adjustments condition, we also expected third parties to offer some reward to Proposers for obeying a fairness norm, the reward being possibly greater in a condition of equity, where some deviation from a 50/50 share is justifiable.
Because we expected little to no variation in the behavior of third parties for the ($5,$5), deduct-only condition, for which we expected no "punishment" (i.e., zero adjustments, as there was no norm violation), we intentionally created an unbalanced design, assigning only 9 participants to this condition and the remainder roughly evenly to the remaining conditions (see Table 1 ). As expected, none of the 9 participants in the ($5,$5), deduct-only condition made any adjustments.
MANOVA F-tests used Pillai-Bartlett's statistic. All analyses of variance respected the principle of marginality and used Type-II sums of squares. Figure 1 shows bivariate mean payoff adjustments by fairness context, offer, and adjustment condition. As expected, there was a clear main effect of adjustment condition, as third parties on average made positive adjustments to payoffs in the punish/compensate condition, and enacted negative sanctions against Proposers in the deduct-only condition. In addition, the amount that the Proposer offered had a strong effect in the expected directions on the adjustments third parties made to the Proposer's and Responder's payoffs. There appeared to be no effect of fairness context, as evidenced by the visual similarity of the left and right panels of Figure 1 . Although the MANOVA detected no effect of fairness context, because we had a specific, directional hypothesis that adjustments to the Proposer would be higher and adjustments to the Responder would be lower in the equity context, we reanalyzed the data using more powerful statistical methods. The effect of adjustment condition was driven by more negative adjustments in the deduct-only condition than in the all-adjustments condition, for both the That adjustments to the Proposer's payoff were higher when the Proposer offered ($5,$5) was consistent with our prediction that third parties would reward fair outcomes. However, we did not expect adjustments to the Responder's payoff to also be positive for ($5,$5) offers, as Responders did nothing to generate the even outcome. This unexpected finding may be due to third parties not wanting to create 2 The permutation test of Strasser & Weber (1999) implemented in the R coin package and described by Hothorn, Hornik, van de Wiel, & Zeileis (2006) maps a multivariate linear statistic, T, defined by the contrasts into a univariate test statistic by standardizing T and taking the maximum of absolute values over T. For the present application, the multivariate linear statistic is the sum of bivariate adjustments in the equality and equity conditions, where the adjustments to the Responder's payoff is pre-multiplied by -1. Standardizing this vector and taking the higher of the absolute value of adjustments to the Proposer's and Responder's payoff yields the univariate test statistic. Permuting the fairness context labels then yields the null distribution, from which the proportion of test statistics greater than the observed statistic determines the p-value. This method is exact up to arbitrary Monte Carlo precision. 13 inequality by rewarding only Proposers. Indeed, creating an inequality in this case would defeat the purpose of positively sanctioning norm-abiding behavior, as in this case the desired outcome is equality.
As expected, there was no evidence of spite (negative adjustments to the Proposer for even offers, or any negative adjustments to the Responder).
Inequality Aversion and Half as a Focal Point
Did third parties attempt to equalize the payoffs of Proposers and Responders? Figure 2 shows mean payoffs before and after third party adjustments. An ANOVA of the difference between the Proposer's and Responder's adjusted payoffs revealed significant effects of offer amount (F(2, 185) = 28.7, p < .0001) and adjustment condition (F(1, 185) = 5.5, p = .02), and no other main effects or interactions. The Proposer's adjusted payoff was $3.40 higher than the Responder's for offers of ($8,$2), p < .0001, $1.97 higher for offers of ($7,$3) , p < .0001, but not significantly different for offers of ($5,$5), p = .14. In the all-adjustments condition, the Proposer's adjusted payoff was $1.28 higher than the Responder's (p < .0001), and $2.81 higher in the deduct-only condition (p < .0001). These remaining payoff inequalities should be judged relative to the original inequalities, which were $0.00 for offers of ($5,$5), $4.00 for ($7,$3), and $6.00 for ($8,$2). On average, third parties reduced the amount of inequality between the Proposer's and Responder's payoffs, but did not equalize them, as indicated by the sizable and statistically significant remaining differences. offers; for ($8,$2) offers, ($5,$5) was the second most frequent outcome. In the alladjustment condition, third parties appeared to be motivated to bring the Responder's payoff up to $5, the 'rightful' share dictated by a norm of fairness. In the deduct-only condition, third parties adjusted the Proposer's payoffs of $8 or $7 to $5, but no lower. Thus, $5 was a focal point for most third parties, and their primary motivation was to ensure payoffs were close to this focal point, although the difference between the modal and mean adjusted payoffs implied significant heterogeneity. Thus, third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality. For the deduct-only condition, expenditures were $0.00 for offers of ($5,$5), $0.43 for offers of ($7,$3), and $0.65 for offers of ($8,$2). For the all-adjustments condition, third parties spent $1.66 for offers of ($5,$5), $0.88 for ($7,$3), and $1.08 for ($8,$2). Of particular note is that the respective expenditures by offer amount in the all-adjustments were all significantly higher than in the deduct-only condition.
Heterogeneity in Third Party Adjustment Behavior
The fact that, on average, third parties adjusted payoffs only partially to equality could belie significant heterogeneity in motives and behavior. The average movement of adjustments in the all-adjustment condition was ($7,$5) and ($8,$5) for offers of ($7,$3) and ($8,$2), and ($8,$9) for ($5,$5) offers. Yet ($5,$5) was the modal outcome for both ($5,$5) offers and ($7,$3) offers, and it was the second most frequent outcome for ($8,$2) offers. This shows that the adjusted payoff of ($5,$5) was a focal point for most, but not all, players.
To explore potential heterogeneity in adjustment behavior, we categorized each outcome into one of the nine combinations formed by whether the Proposer's and the Responder's payoffs respectively were increased, decreased, or left unchanged; Table 2 tabulates these categories by offer amount and adjustment condition. There was a substantial number of failures to make any payoff adjustment (see (n,n) category), comprising 12-30% of the data in the all-adjustments condition, and 34-100% of the data in the deduct-only condition. Because adjustments had a monetary cost to participants, it is likely that such behavior reflects greater weighting of selfish motives compared to the desire to punish, reward, or compensate.
Moreover, for some participants this selfish concern appears to be stronger when outcomes are very unequal, as it costs more to restore equality. Despite the observation that, on average, third parties spent more when faced with ($8,$2), in the all-adjustment condition, 30% chose to do nothing (n,n), as opposed to only 12% of third parties who were presented with the ($7,$3) outcome. And whereas 35% of third partied presented with ($7,$3) compensated the Responder (n,+), only 15% of those presented with ($8,$2) did so.
Although the majority of the remaining adjustments reduced the amount of inequality, there was clearly a separate motive to increase total payoffs. 61% of participants increased both the Proposer's and Responder's payoffs for ($5,$5) offers, 18% did so for ($7,$3) offers, and 25% did so for ($8,$2) offers. On the whole, it appears that third parties sought to pursue a variety of sanctioning motives subject to the constraint that they create no additional inequality. 
Offer
(+,+) (n,+) (-,+) (+,n) (+,-) (n,n) (-,n) (n,-) (-,-)
All-Adj. 1 "+" represents a positive adjustment to the offer, "-" a negative adjustment, and "n" no adjustment. In each pair, the first position represents an adjustment to the payoff of the Proposer, and the second position represents an adjustment to the payoff of the Responder. For example, for an offer of ($7,$3), an adjusted payoff of ($5,$5) would be classified as "(-,+)" and an adjusted payoff of ($7,$7) would be classified as "(n,+)".
3.6. Third-Party Fairness beliefs Table 3 shows average third party first and second-order fairness beliefs by fairness context and offer. 47 participants were excluded due to missing data. Fairness beliefs were unimodal, with almost all participants indicating that ($5,$5) was fair and that they believed the majority of other third parties believed it was fair. At the extremes, only 5% of participants considered ($10,$0) to be fair, whereas 15% considered ($0,$10) to be fair.
There were differences in beliefs by fairness context. Consistent with our hypotheses, participants in the equity context were more likely than participants in the equality context to view splits favoring the Proposer as being "fair for both the Proposer and the Responder," averaging across offers. On the other hand, participants in the equality context were more likely to view splits favoring the Responder as being "fair for both the Proposer and the Responder." Second-order beliefs (whether the participant believed the majority of other participants believed each option was fair) exhibited a similar pattern, characterized by participants in the equity context being more likely to believe that others though splits favoring the Proposer were fair. Similarly, in the equality condition, splits favoring the Responders were believed to be judged as fair by the majority of participants.
Because Table 3 reveals only average fairness beliefs, it potentially masks a variety of important individual-level patterns. Consider, for example, that 5% of participants believed ($10,$0) was "fair for both the Proposer and the Responder"
(hereafter "fair for both players") and that 15% believed ($0,$10) was fair for both players. It would seem highly unlikely that these two groups overlapped at all. More generally, we expected that participants who held Proposer-favoring beliefs (i.e., To investigate participant-level heterogeneity in beliefs, we subjected the 11 firstorder fairness beliefs to a latent class analysis. A four-class solution shown in Table   4 was chosen based on successive goodness of fit tests and interpretability. Class 1
had an estimated population share of 42%, and was characterized by participants who believed that roughly even splits -namely ($6,$4), ($5,$5), and ($4,$6) -were fair. Class 2 accounted for an estimated 34% of the population, and was characterized by the belief that only ($5,$5) was fair. Class 3 had an estimated population share of 16%, and was characterized primarily by the belief that
Responder-favoring splits -namely ($0,$10), ($1,$9), ($2,$8), ($3,$7), ($4,$6) -were fair. Finally, Class 4 accounted for 9% of population and was characterized by the belief that Proposer-favoring splits -namely ($9,$1), ($8,$2), ($7,$3), ($6,$4) -were fair. Third party norm-regulating behavior appeared to be driven by at least two distinct motives: 1) to reward equal outcomes without creating inequality and 2) to adjust parties' unequal payoffs to a normative value. When adding to the payoffs of the Proposer or the Responder was an option, third parties increased the payoffs of both parties in equal amounts when the Proposer offered ($5,$5). For uneven offers of ($7,$3) or ($8,$2), however, third parties reduced inequality either by compensating the Responder when compensation was an available option, or -when the only option for adjustment was to deduct -by punishing the Proposer. Of note is that adjustments in both conditions give one of the players his "rightful" payoff of $5, in line with a fairness norm.
When roles of Proposer and Responder were assigned randomly, a sizable number of third parties considered divisions that favored the Responder, such as ($2,$8) and ($1,$9) as being "fair for both the Proposer and the Responder." When roles were assigned based on performance on an arbitrary quiz, this effect disappeared, and third parties instead adopted beliefs that legitimized the entitlement of the Proposer to a greater share, many reporting that divisions such as ($9,$1) and ($8,$2) were "fair for both the Proposer and the Responder." However, the manner in which roles were assigned to Proposers and Responders did not affect adjustment behavior. Because our analyses showed strong effects of fairness context on fairness beliefs, we consider our manipulation of the relevant fairness norm --equality, in the case of random role assignment, and equity, in the case of performance-based role assignment --to have been successful. Against the background of previous findings that equity contexts lowered offers (Hoffman et al., 1994) , one interpretation of our findings is that the equality norm overshadowed the effects of fairness context.
Another possibility is that normative consensus is not a good predictor of behavior, and that actual behavior better measures the intensity with which normative principles are adhered to. Whereas our questionnaire measures the level of normative consensus, actual behavior measures the intensity with which these principles are adhered to (Rauhut & Winter, 2010) . Thus, though third parties recognize the difference between equity and equality, their behavior is much less fine-tuned,
showing that an egalitarian principle is far more important than equity in deciding how to adjust players' payoffs.
In addition, third parties were more willing to incur personal costs to modify the payoffs of others when they had the opportunity to sanction or compensate, as opposed to having only the option to negatively sanction. This finding is relevant to theories of justice and tort law in which the compensation of a victim may be traded 25 off against the punishment of a perpetrator, and suggests that on the whole, third parties are averse to punishing and prefer instead to compensate.
Although third party punishment has been extensively studied in laboratory settings, our paper contributes to the literature by comparing a broader set of regulatory mechanisms that can serve to uphold a norm, namely negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties. Future work could compare brain activation patterns implicated in negative sanctioning (e.g., Buckholtz, et al., 2008; de Quervain, et al., 2004) to those in positive sanctioning or compensation to test whether different mechanisms of regulating social norms activate the same neural pathways. As interest grows in studying the regulation of norms other than fairness -such as trust, reciprocity, and corruption -it will be increasingly important to consider both positive sanctioning and compensation behavior in addition to negative sanctioning to better understand how norms operate in the real world.
